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Abstract
In late December 2019, a novel strand of Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) causing a severe, potentially fatal res-
piratory syndrome (COVID-19) was identified in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China and is causing outbreaks in
multiple world countries, soon becoming a pandemic. Italy has now become the most hit country outside of
Asia: on March 16, 2020, the Italian Civil Protection documented a total of 27980 confirmed cases and 2158
deaths of people tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. In the context of an emerging infectious disease outbreak, it
is of paramount importance to predict the trend of the epidemic in order to plan an effective control strategy
and to determine its impact. This paper proposes a new epidemic model that discriminates between infected
individuals depending on whether they have been diagnosed and on the severity of their symptoms. The dis-
tinction between diagnosed and non-diagnosed is important because non-diagnosed individuals are more likely
to spread the infection than diagnosed ones, since the latter are typically isolated, and can explain mispercep-
tions of the case fatality rate and of the seriousness of the epidemic phenomenon. Being able to predict the
amount of patients that will develop life-threatening symptoms is important since the disease frequently requires
hospitalisation (and even Intensive Care Unit admission) and challenges the healthcare system capacity. We
show how the basic reproduction number can be redefined in the new framework, thus capturing the potential
for epidemic containment. Simulation results are compared with real data on the COVID-19 epidemic in Italy,
to show the validity of the model and compare different possible predicted scenarios depending on the adopted
countermeasures.
Keywords — COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2 infection spread, extended SIR model.
1 Introduction
In late December 2019, a novel strand of Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) causing a severe, potentially fatal respiratory
syndrome (COVID-19) was identified in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China [1, 2]. Starting from December 18, 2019,
an exponentially growing number of patients in mainland China were admitted to hospitals with a diagnosis of
COVID-19, prompting Chinese authorities to introduce radical measures to contain the outbreak [3].
Despite those efforts, the virus had managed to spread to several parts of the world: a report from WHO dated
March 4, 2020 documented a grand total of 93090 confirmed cases spanning 77 different countries worldwide [4].
Italy has since become the most hit country outside of Asia [5]. After the first indigenous case was confirmed on
February 21, 2020, in the Lodi province (Lombardy, northern Italy), several suspect cases, initially epidemiologically
linked, began to emerge in the south and southwest territory of Lombardy [6].
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A red zone, in which SARS-CoV-2 infection is considered endemic, was instituted on February 22, 2020, en-
compassing 11 municipalities all surrounding and including the epicenter of the infection; those cities were put on
lockdown to try and contain the emerging threat. Regional health authorities promoted an aggressive campaign to
identify and screen all close contacts with confirmed cases of COVID-19 that resulted, up until March 16, 2020, in
the execution of 137962 nasal swabs for the detection of the virus. Of the overall 27980 detected cases in Italy at
the time of the report, 23073 were currently infected (particularly, 11025 were hospitalised, 1851 were admitted to
Intensive Care Units, 10197 were quarantined at home), 2749 were considered clinically healed and discharged and
2158 died [7]. In the first days of the outbreak, both symptomatic and asymptomatic subjects underwent screening,
after which a Government regulation dated February 26, 2020 limited screening to symptomatic subjects only, due
partly to a shortage of material and partly to most tests resulting negative, according to Italian Civil Protection
data [8, 9]. On March 8, 2020, in an effort to further contain the spread of SARS-CoV-2, an administrative act
extended the red zone to the entire area of Lombardy and 14 more northern Italian provinces. Eventually, on the
evening of March 9, 2020, the entire country was declared as red zone [10].
COVID-19 displays peculiar epidemiological traits when compared to previous outbreaks due to related viruses
such as SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV. According to early Chinese data [11], a large quota of transmissions, both in
a nosocomial and in a community setting, occurred through human-to-human contacts with individuals showing no
or mild symptoms of the disease. The estimated basic reproduction number (R0) for SARS-CoV-2 is higher than
both for SARS-CoV and for MERS-CoV (ranging from 2.0 to 3.5) [12, 13, 14]. Additionally, high viral loads of
SARS-CoV-2 were found in upper respiratory specimens of patients showing little or no symptoms, with a viral
shedding pattern akin to that of influenza viruses [15]. These findings suggest that inapparent transmission may
play a major and underestimated role in sustaining the outbreak.
In the context of an emerging infectious disease outbreak, predicting the trend of the epidemic is of paramount
importance to plan effective control strategies and determine how said strategies impact the course of the epidemic.
Predictive mathematical models have been formulated over the years [16, 17, 18, 19], including the SIR model, a
simple and widely-used deterministic model for human-to-human transmission that describes the flow of individuals
through three mutually exclusive stages of infection: Susceptible (S), Infected (I) and Recovered (R) [20].
However, more complex models are needed to accurately portray the dynamic characteristics of specific epi-
demics. To this end, we propose a new mean-field epidemiological model, inspired by the COVID-19 epidemic in
Italy, that serves as an extension of the classical SIR model in the wake of Gumel et al., who developed a variant
dynamic mathematical model that reflected some key epidemiological properties of SARS [21]. For COVID-19,
Lin et al. considered an extended SEIR model including a variable representing risk perception and a variable
representing the cumulative number of cases [22], while Anastassopoulou et al. proposed a discrete-time SIR model
including a variable for Dead individuals [23], and Casella proposed a control-oriented SIR model stressing the
role of delays, to compare the outcome of different policies aimed at containing the epidemics [24], while Wu et
al. observed transmission dynamics to estimate clinical severity [25]; stochastic transmission models have been also
considered, see for instance [26, 27].
Our new model, named SIDARTHE, discriminates between detected and undetected cases of infection, either
asymptomatic or symptomatic, and also between different Severity of Illness (SOI): non-life-threatening cases (minor
and moderate infection) and potentially life-threatening cases (major and extreme) that require Intensive Care Unit
(ICU) admission. We omit the probability rate of becoming susceptible again, after having already recovered from
the infection. Although anecdotal cases are found in literature, the reinfection rate value appears to be negligible
based on early evidence [28].
We estimate the model parameters based on national data about the evolution of the epidemic in Italy in the
period from February 20, 2020 to March 12, 2020. Based on this model calibration, we discuss possible longer-term
scenarios that showcase the impact of different countermeasures to contain the contagion.
2 Results
We present here the proposed model and we analyse it: we study possible equilibria and their stability, which are
related to the possible long-term outcomes of the epidemics, and we generalise to our model the concept of the
basic reproduction number, R0, which is the expected number of new cases directly generated by a single infected
subject; in SIR models, the basic reproduction number corresponds to the ratio between the probability of contact
between Susceptible and Infected, leading to contagion, and the probability of turning from Infected to Recovered,
under the ideal assumption that all actual cases of infection are recognised as such.
Then, using the available official data to estimate the model parameters, we study the evolution of the COVID-19
epidemic in Italy, comparing possible scenarios resulting from different social-distancing measures.
2.1 SIDARTHE Mathematical Model
In our model, the total population is partitioned into the following eight stages: S, Susceptible; I, Infected (asymp-
tomatic infected, undetected); D, Diagnosed (asymptomatic infected, detected); A, Ailing (symptomatic infected,
undetected); R, Recognised (symptomatic infected, detected); T, Threatened (infected with life-threatening symp-
toms, detected); H, Healed (recovered); E, Extinct (dead). The interactions among these eight stages and the
related interaction parameters are shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Graphical scheme representing the interactions among different stages of infection in the mathematical model SIDARTHE.
The SIDARTHE dynamical system consists of eight ordinary differential equations, describing the evolution of
the population in each stage over time:
S˙(t) = −S(t)(αI(t) + βD(t) + γA(t) + δR(t)) (1)
I˙(t) = S(t)(αI(t) + βD(t) + γA(t) + δR(t))− (+ ζ + λ)I(t) (2)
D˙(t) = I(t)− (η + ρ)D(t) (3)
A˙(t) = ζI(t)− (θ + µ+ κ)A(t) (4)
R˙(t) = ηD(t) + θA(t)− (ν + ξ)R(t) (5)
T˙ (t) = µA(t) + νR(t)− (σ + τ)T (t) (6)
H˙(t) = λI(t) + ρD(t) + κA(t) + ξR(t) + σT (t) (7)
E˙(t) = τT (t) (8)
where the uppercase Latin letters (state variables) represent the fraction of population in each stage, while all the
considered parameters, denoted by Greek letters, are positive numbers. In particular, the parameters:
• α, β, γ, δ respectively denote the transmission rate (i.e. the probability of disease transmission in a single
contact times the average number of contacts per person) due to contacts between a Susceptible subject and
an Infected, a Diagnosed, an Ailing, a Recognised subject. Typically, α is larger than γ (assuming that people
tend to avoid contacts with subjects showing symptoms, even though diagnosis has not been made yet), which
in turn is probably larger than β and δ (assuming that subjects who have been diagnosed are properly isolated).
These parameters can be modified by social distancing policies (e.g., closing schools, remote working, etc.).
The risk of contagion due to Threatened subjects, treated in proper ICUs, is assumed negligible.
•  and θ capture the probability rate of detection, relative to asymptomatic and mildly symptomatic cases
respectively. These parameters, also modifiable, reflect the level of attention on the disease and the number
of tests performed over the population. Note that θ is typically larger than , since a symptomatic individual
is more likely to get tested.
• ζ and η denote the probability rate at which an infected subject, respectively not aware and aware of being
infected, develops clinically relevant symptoms, and are probably comparable. These parameters are disease-
dependent and hardly modifiable.
• µ and ν respectively denote the rate at which undetected and detected infected subjects develop life-threatening
symptoms, and are likely to be comparable if there is no known specific treatment that is effective against the
disease, otherwise µ is likely to be larger. These parameters can be reduced by means of improved therapies
and acquisition of immunity against the virus.
• τ denotes the mortality rate (for infected subjects with life-threatening symptoms) and can be reduced by
means of improved therapies.
• λ, κ, ξ, ρ and σ denote the rate of recovery for the five classes of infected subjects, and may differ significantly
if an appropriate treatment for the disease is known and adopted to diagnosed patients, while are probably
comparable otherwise. These parameters can be increased thanks to improved treatments and acquisition of
immunity against the virus.
We omit the probability rate of becoming susceptible again, after having already recovered from the infection,
since its value appears to be negligible (although not zero) based on early evidence [28, 29].
2.2 Analysis of the Mathematical Model
The SIDARTHE model (1)-(8) is a bilinear system with 8 differential equations. The system is positive: all the
state variables take nonnegative values for t ≥ 0 if initialised at time 0 with nonnegative values. Note that H(t)
and E(t) are cumulative variables that depend only on the other ones and their own initial conditions.
The system is compartmental and has the mass conservation property: as it can be immediately checked,
S˙(t) + I˙(t) + D˙(t) + A˙(t) + R˙(t) + T˙ (t) + H˙(t) + E˙(t) = 0, hence the sum of the states (total population) is constant.
Since the variables denote population fractions, we can assume:
S(t) + I(t) +D(t) +A(t) +R(t) + T (t) +H(t) + E(t) = 1,
where 1 denotes the total population, including deceased.
Given an initial condition S(0), I(0), D(0), A(0), R(0), T (0), H(0), E(0) summing up to 1, the variables
converge to an equilibrium
S¯ ≥ 0, I¯ = 0, D¯ = 0, A¯ = 0, R¯ = 0, T¯ = 0, H¯ ≥ 0, E¯ ≥ 0,
with S¯ + H¯ + E¯ = 1, as shown in the Methods section. So only the susceptible, the healed and the deceased
populations are eventually present, meaning that the epidemic phenomenon is over.
To understand the system behaviour, we partition it into three subsystems: the first including just variable
S (corresponding to susceptible individuals), the second including variables H and E (representing healed and
defuncts), and the third including I, D, A, R and T (the infected individuals), which are nonzero only during the
transient. We focus on the third subsystem, which we denote as the IDART subsystem. An important observation
is that when (and only when) the infected individuals I+D+A+R+T are zero, the remaining variables S, H and
E are at the equilibrium. Variables H and E (which are monotonically increasing) converge to their asymptotic
values H¯ and E¯, and S (which is monotonically decreasing) converges to S¯ if and only if I, D, A, R and T converge
to zero.
The overall system can be recast in the feedback structure shown in Figure 2: the IDART subsystem can be
seen as a positive linear systems subject to feedback.
To be precise, defining x = [I DART ]>, we can rewrite the IDART subsystem as
x˙(t) = Fx(t) + bu(t) =

−r1 0 0 0 0
 −r2 0 0 0
ζ 0 −r3 0 0
0 η θ −r4 0
0 0 µ ν −r5
x(t) +

1
0
0
0
0
u(t) (9)
yS(t) = c
>x(t) =
[
α β γ δ 0
]
x(t) (10)
yH(t) = f
>x(t) =
[
λ ρ κ ξ σ
]
x(t) (11)
yE(t) = d
>x(t) =
[
0 0 0 0 τ
]
x(t) (12)
u(t) = S(t)yS(t) (13)
𝑆(𝑡)
𝑥(0)
Σ
𝑦𝐸(𝑡)
𝑦𝐻(𝑡)
𝑦𝑆(𝑡)
Figure 2: Intrinsic feedback in the SIDARTHE model: the IDART subsystem, Σ, can be seen as a positive linear system under feedback,
and variables S, H and E can be computed based on its outputs.
where r1 =  + ζ + λ, r2 = η + ρ, r3 = θ + µ + κ, r4 = ν + ξ, r5 = σ + τ . The remaining variables satisfy the
differential equations
S˙(t) = −S(t)yS(t) (14)
H˙(t) = yH(t) (15)
E˙(t) = yE(t) (16)
Since the time varying feedback gain S(t) eventually converges to a constant value S¯, we can proceed with a
parametric study with respect to the asymptotic feedback gain S¯. A fundamental result is given in the following
proposition, proved in the Methods section.
Proposition 1. The IDART subsystem with constant feedback S¯ is asymptotically stable if and only if
S¯ < S¯∗ =
r1r2r3r4
αr2r3r4 + βr3r4 + γζr2r4 + δ(ηr3 + ζθr2)
. (17)
The threshold S¯∗ is of fundamental importance. Since asymptotically S(t) converges monotonically to a constant
S¯, such a constant S¯ must ensure convergence of the IDART subsystem to zero, hence stability (otherwise, S could
not converge to S¯). As a consequence, we have the following result.
Proposition 2. For positive initial conditions, the limit value S¯ = limt→∞ S(t) cannot exceed S¯∗.
The proof is in the Methods section.
The threshold value (17) has a deep meaning. The limit S¯ represents the fraction of population that has
never been infected. This value is a decreasing function of the parameters α, β, γ and δ, which are the infection
parameters. The feedback action
u(t) = S(t)yS(t) = S(t)(αI + βD + γA+ δD)
has a destabilizing effect on the IDART subsystem, which would be stable without the feedback. To preserve
stability of the IDART subsystem and ensure that the equilibrium S¯ is reached, either the infection coefficients
are small or the final value S¯ is small. Defining the basic reproduction number as
R0 :=
1
S¯∗
=
α
r1
+
β
r1r2
+
γζ
r1r3
+
δη
r1r2r4
+
δζθ
r1r3r4
, (18)
we have that stability of the equilibrium occurs for
S¯R¯0 < 1. (19)
At the outset of the epidemic we have S¯ ' 1, so that stability occurs for
R0 < 1,
which essentially represents an immediate recover with no large involvement of the population. Larger values of R0
imply a strong affection of the population according to (19).
We can provide an important formula that relates the coefficient R0 with the steady-state value S¯ (and H¯, E¯).
The derivation is in the Methods section.
Proposition 3. For positive initial conditions, the limit values of S¯ = limt→∞ S(t), H¯ = limt→∞H(t) and
E¯ = limt→∞E(t) are given by
f0 +R0(S(0)− S¯) = log
(
S(0)
S¯
)
(20)
H¯ = H(0) + fH +RH(S(0)− S¯) (21)
E¯ = E(0) + fE +RE(S(0)− S¯) (22)
where f0 = −c>F−1x(0), fH = −f>F−1x(0), fE = −d>F−1x(0), RH = −f>F−1b and RE = −d>F−1b.
If we consider an initial condition in which only undiagnosed infected I(0) > 0 are present, while D(0) = A(0) =
R(0) = 0, then we can explicitly compute f0 = −c>F−1
[
I(0) 0 0 0 0
]>
as
f0 = R0I(0). (23)
It is important to stress that (23) could be totally misleading for a long term prediction, because in the long run the
coefficients of matrix F are going to change. So, if there is a change in the parameters at a time t0, for instance due
to imposed restrictions and countermeasures, the prediction has to be adjusted by considering f0 = −c>F−1x(t0),
where x(t0) = [I(t0) D(t0) A(t0) R(t0) T (t0)]
> and F includes the new parameter values. Clearly also (20) has to
be updated by considering the new S(t0).
An important indicator of the dynamics of epidemiologic model is the case fatality rate, CFR, which is the ratio
between number of deaths and number of infected. Our model allows us to distinguish between the actual CFR
M(t) and the perceived CFR P (t), which are defined as
M(t) =
E(t)∫ t
0
S(φ)[αI(φ) + βD(φ) + γA(φ) + δR(φ)]dφ
(24)
P (t) =
E(t)∫ t
0
[I(φ) + (θ + µ)A(φ)]dφ
(25)
Taking into account that
S(t) = S(0) + I(0)− I(t)− r1
∫ t
0
I(φ)dφ, (26)
we can provide the explicit formulas
M(t) =
E(t)
S(0)− S(t) (27)
P (t) =
E(t)
r3+(θ+µ)ζ
r1r3
[I(0) + S(0)− I(t)− S(t)] + θ+µr3 [A(0)−A(t)]
(28)
with equilibria
M¯ =
E¯
S(0)− S¯ (29)
P¯ =
E¯
r3+(θ+µ)ζ
r1r3
[I(0) + S(0)− S¯] + θ+µr3 A(0)
(30)
2.3 Case Study: the COVID-19 Outbreak in Italy
We consider the outbreak of COVID-19 epidemic in Italy. We estimate the model parameters based on data about
the evolution of the epidemic in Italy in the period from February 20, 2020 to March 12, 2020; more details are in
the Methods section. Based on this model calibration, we discuss possible longer-term scenarios that showcase the
impact of different countermeasures to contain the contagion.
The fraction of the population in each stage at day 1 is set as: I = 200/60e6, D = 20/60e6, A = 1/60e6,
R = 2/60e6, T = 0, H = 0, E = 0; S = 1 − I −D − A − R − T −H − E. The parameters are set as α = 0.570,
β = δ = 0.011, γ = 0.456,  = 0.171, θ = 0.371, ζ = η = 0.125, µ = 0.012, ν = 0.027, τ = 0.003, λ = ρ = 0.034,
κ = ξ = σ = 0.017. The resulting basic reproduction number is R0 = 2.38, which leads to a significant growth of
the number of infected individuals.
After day 4, as a consequence of basic social distancing measures due to the public opinion being aware of the
epidemic outbreak and due to recommendations (such as washing hands often, not touching one’s face, avoiding
handshakes and keeping distance) and early measures (such as closing schools) by the Italian government, we set
α = 0.422, γ = 0.285 and β = δ = 0.0057, thus the new basic reproduction number becomes R0 = 1.66.
Also, after day 12, we set  = 0.143 as a consequence of the policy limiting screening to symptomatic individ-
uals only; thus, totally asymptomatic individuals are almost no longer detected, while individuals with very mild
symptoms are still detected (hence  is not set exactly to zero).
Then, the comparison between the data and the curves resulting from the SIDARTHE model is reported in
Figure 6, which shows the epidemic evolution in the first 23 days. Figure 3 (a) shows the evolution of the full
model with the estimated parameters over this short horizon and highlights that, in the earliest epidemic phase, the
number of infected is significantly underestimated: almost 50% of the cases are not diagnosed; Figure 3 (b) shows
how the infected individuals are partitioned into the different sub-populations (diagnosed or not, with different SOI
classification).
Based on the obtained model calibration, we can discuss possible longer-term scenarios that showcase the impact
of different countermeasures to contain the contagion (based on a completely different model, the impact of different
mitigation measures for pandemic influenza in Italy was compared in [30]).
2.3.1 Simulation of Intervention Scenarios
In the absence of further countermeasures, the model predicts an evolution that leads to 73% of the population
having contracted the virus (and about 64% having been diagnosed), and about 5.2% of the population having died
because of the contagion over a 300-days horizon, as shown in Figure 3 (c). Note that the number of eventually
recovered people can be computed based on the formula (21), while the overall number of deaths can be computed
as in (22). The peak of the number of concurrently infected individuals occurs around 76 days, and amounts to
around 44% of the population; however, the peak of concurrently diagnosed infected individuals occurs later, around
82 days, and amounts to 39% of the population. The actual CFR is then around 7.2%, while the perceived CFR is
around 9.0%; these values can be computed directly using the formulas in (29) and (30) respectively. Figure 3 (d)
shows how the different sub-populations of infected individuals evolve over time, and it is interesting to notice that
each sub-population reaches its peak at a different time. In particular, the fraction of infected who need Intensive
Care reaches its peak, almost 16.5% of the population, after 107 days.
Clearly some containment measures are needed, and indeed the Italian government decided for a country-wide
lockdown starting with March 9th, whose effect will clearly be visible with a delay. It is still unclear how strongly
this lockdown will reduce the infection parameters. We consider possible different scenarios.
First, we assume that the increased social-distancing countermeasures lead after day 22 to α = 0.285 and
γ = 0.171, thus R0 = 1.13, which is still larger than 1. Hence, the peak is delayed (and reduced in amplitude),
because the increase in the number of new infected is reduced. This helps gain more time to strengthen and supply
the healthcare system, but is not enough to make sure the epidemic phenomenon recedes. Over a 500-days horizon,
as shown in Figure 4 (a), the model predicts an evolution that leads to a peak in the number of concurrently infected
individuals around day 170, amounting to 11.7% of the population (10.6% of the population have been diagnosed).
Eventually, 35% of the population has contracted the virus (and about 30% have been diagnosed), and about 2.5%
of the population has died because of the contagion. The actual (resp. perceived) CFR is then still around 7.2%
(resp. 9.0%). The fraction of patients in need of Intensive Care, as shown in Figure 4 (b), reaches its peak on day
198, amounting to 5.3% of the population. We see that the adopted social-distancing policy, although mild, have
some impact. They are still insufficient, though.
Stronger social-distancing countermeasures are required, able to yield, after day 22, α = 0.200 and γ = 0.086,
hence R0 = 0.787, which is now lower than 1. Now the peak is not delayed, but anticipated, because the increase in
the number of new infected is reduced so much that it soon becomes a decrease. Over a 300-days horizon, as shown
in Figure 4 (c), the model predicts an evolution of the situation that leads to a peak in the number of concurrently
infected individuals around day 50, amounting to 0.092% of the population; the peak in diagnosed infected occurs
at day 54 and amounts to 0.083% of the population. Eventually, 0.25% of the population has contracted the virus
(and about 0.22% have been diagnosed), and about 0.02% of the population has died because of the contagion. The
actual (resp. perceived) CFR is then still around 7.2% (resp. 9.0%). The fraction of patients in need of Intensive
Care, as shown in Figure 4 (d), reaches its peak on day 85, amounting to 0.04% of the population.
Even stronger social-distancing countermeasures are worth being adopted: after day 22, α = γ = 0.057, hence
R0 = 0.329, which is significantly lower than 1. Over a 300-days horizon, as shown in Figure 4 (e), the model
predicts an evolution of the situation that leads to a peak in the number of concurrently infected individuals around
day 25, amounting to 0.057% of the population; the peak in diagnosed infected occurs at day 35 and amounts
to 0.048% of the population. Eventually, 0.086% of the population has contracted the virus (and about 0.074%
have been diagnosed), and about 0.006% of the population has died because of the contagion. The actual (resp.
perceived) CFR is then still around 7.2% (resp. 9.0%). The fraction of patients in need of Intensive Care, as shown
in Figure 4 (f), reaches its peak on day 64, amounting to 0.02% of the population.
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(a) Short-term evolution: actual vs. diagnosed cases of infection.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
Time (days)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Ca
se
s 
(fr
ac
tio
n o
f th
e p
op
ula
tio
n)
10-4 Infected, different stages, Diagnosed vs. Non Diagnosed
Infected ND AS
Infected D AS
Infected ND S
Infected D S
Infected D IC
(b) Short-term evolution of infected sub-populations.
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(c) Long-term evolution: actual vs. diagnosed cases of infection.
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(d) Long-term evolution of infected sub-populations.
Figure 3: Epidemic evolution predicted by the model in the absence of further social-distancing countermeasures. The difference
between the actual and the perceived evolution of the epidemics is shown; we assume that all deaths caused by the epidemics are
correctly identified as such, while the number of infected and recovered individuals is underestimated because not all the population is
tested and diagnosed.
Forecast. We have fitted the model based on the available data in the period February 20, 2020 (day 1) to March
12, 2020 (day 22). Now the data up to March 20, 2020 (day 30) are available. Which is the scenario they fit the
best? Concerning the number of cumulative diagnosed cases and the number of currently infected, the best fit is
with the scenario with mild social-distancing countermeasures (discussed in Figure 4, panels a and b), as can be
seen in Figure 5. Of course the effect of the adopted social-distancing policies can be seen with some delay, so
we can hope that the scenario will get closer to the one with strong social-distancing countermeasures in the near
future. If not, our prediction suggests the need of even stronger countermeasures.
3 Discussion
The key feature of our proposed model is the distinction between detected and undetected infection cases, and
between cases with different SOI classification (mild and moderate vs. major and extreme).
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(a) Epidemic evolution: actual vs. diagnosed cases of infection.
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(b) Evolution of infected sub-populations.
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(c) Epidemic evolution: actual vs. diagnosed cases of infection.
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(d) Evolution of infected sub-populations.
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(e) Epidemic evolution: actual vs. diagnosed cases of infection.
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(f) Evolution of infected sub-populations.
Figure 4: Epidemic evolution predicted by the model with mild (panels a and b), strong (panels c and d) and very strong (panels e
and f) social-distancing countermeasures. The difference between the actual and the perceived evolution of the epidemics is shown; we
assume that all deaths caused by the epidemics are correctly identified as such, while the number of infected and recovered individuals
is underestimated because not all the population is tested and diagnosed.
5 10 15 20 25 30
Time (days)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ca
se
s 
(fr
ac
tio
n o
f th
e p
op
ula
tio
n)
10-4 Diagnosed Infected: Model vs. Data
(a) Currently infected: D(t) +R(t) + T (t).
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Figure 5: Comparison between the official data (red dots histogram) and the results with the calibrated SIDARTHE model in the
presence of mild social-distancing countermeasures (blue line).
Distinguishing between diagnosed and not diagnosed cases allows us to highlight the perceived distortion in
disease statistics, such as the number of infected individuals, the transmission rate and the case fatality rate
(CFR, typically defined as the ratio between the number of deaths ascribed to the infection and the number of
diagnosed cases). The discrepancy between the actual CFR (total number of deaths due to the infection, divided
by the total number of people who have been infected) and the perceived CFR (number of deaths ascribed to
the infection, divided by the number of people who have been diagnosed as infected) can be quantified based on
this model. Therefore, the model can explain the possible discrepancy between the actual infection dynamics and
the perception of the phenomenon. Misperception (either resulting in underestimating or overestimating) can be
particularly relevant in the early phases of an epidemic phenomenon, due to the lack of thorough information: for
instance, performing an insufficient number of tests may lead to underestimating the transmission rate (because
many infected subjects are not diagnosed as such) and overestimating the case fatality rate (because critical or fatal
cases hardly go undetected). The model thus provides a rough quantification of the error in estimating the actual
number of infected people due to the lack of proper diagnostic tests, or due to insufficient number of diagnostic tests
being performed. Also, it can explain and predict the long-term effects of underdiagnosis, including the (apparently
surprising) increased number of infections and fatalities, with sudden outbreaks after long silent periods.
Concerning diagnostic tests for COVID-19, currently, standard molecular methods to detect the presence of
SARS-CoV-2 in respiratory samples are aspecific real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-
PCR), which target RNA dependent RNA polymerase and E genes [31]. These are time consuming techniques
that cannot be performed to all the susceptible population. Moreover, high false negatives rates are reported and
certified laboratories with expensive equipment are needed [32]. Rapid tests with high sensitivity and specificity are
urgently required to be easily developed in the real life settings such as schools, airports, train stations etc. Some
laboratories are actually moving in this direction by developing a 15 minutes test to detect SARS-CoV-2 IgM and
IgG simultaneously in human blood [33].
Once the model parameters have been estimated on the basis of the available clinical data, the model enables
us to reproduce and predict the dynamic evolution of the epidemic, and to evaluate the possible underestimation
or overestimation of the epidemic phenomenon based on current statistics, which are heavily subject to bias (e.g,
asymptomatic patients may get tested according to some protocols, not tested according to others). The model
helps evaluate and predict the effect of the implementation of different guidelines and protocols (for example, more
extensive screening for the disease or stricter social distancing measures), which typically results in a change in the
model parameters. In general, we can observe the following.
• The model predictions in the long run are not very sensitive to the initial conditions, but they are extremely
sensitive to the parameter values, which are deeply uncertain and can vary due to several factors, such as
population density, cultural habits, environmental conditions, age distribution of the population.
• The predictions must take into account parameter variations due to the measures imposed by the Government.
This is a fundamental aspect: in the long term, not imposing drastic measures leads to catastrophic outcomes,
even when the initially affected population is a small fraction.
• Social-distancing measures are modelled by reducing the infection coefficients (α, β, γ and δ). The infection
peak time is not monotonic with increasing restrictions. Partial restrictions on the population movements
initially postpone the peak, while strong restrictions anticipate the peak. Mild containment measures may
have negative effects, for instance augmenting the fraction of population with life-threatening symptoms with
respect to the fraction of population with mild symptoms.
• Diagnosis campaigns can reduce the infection peak, because the diagnosed population enters the quarantine,
hence it is less likely to affect the susceptible population. Anyway, healthcare workers are particularly exposed
and their risk of infection is ever increasing, as supported by Chinese reports for the COVID-19 case [34, 35]
that suggest disease amplification in healthcare settings despite restrictive measures.
• The model does not take into account reduced availability of medical care due to the healthcare system
reaching or even surpassing its capacity [36]. This can be done only indirectly. For instance, when the number
of seriously affected individuals is high (above a threshold), the mortality coefficient can be increased, due to
the lack of ICUs.
Our simulation results, achieved by combining the model with the available data about the COVID-19 epidemic
in Italy, suggest the urgent need – and the effectiveness – of strong social-distancing measures, in line with [2, 24, 26].
We compare scenarios with control measures of varying strength, predicting for each the timing and magnitude
of the epidemic peak, including the peak of ICU admissions. According to our findings, a partial implementation
of control measures will result in a delay in the peak of infected individuals and patients admitted to the ICU,
contrasting with an only moderate decrease in the total number of infected individuals and ICU admission due
to COVID-19. On the other hand, the implementation of very strong social-distancing strategies will result in an
anticipated peak of infected individuals and patients admitted to the ICU, with a marked decrease in the total
number of infected individuals and ICU admissions due to the disease, and is by and large the preferable option.
Although the mortality rate (number of deaths in the whole population) of COVID-19 is a decreasing function
of restriction measures, the case fatality rate (number of deaths in the infected population) is essentially constant
in different scenarios, hence it is unaffected by the extent of social restriction. Despite rigid isolation policies,
COVID-19 patients may still be burdened with excess case fatality. In this perspective, efforts should be placed on
developing more effective treatment strategies to combat the disease. As new drugs and vaccines are being tested
and evaluated, the current scenario will most likely evolve based on the ongoing innovations in the therapeutic and
immunological fields [37, 38, 39, 40].
As a possible future development, with the appropriate data, the model can be extended to predict the simul-
taneous evolution of other diseases, which, due to the epidemic emergency, may be overestimated, underestimated
or not treated appropriately because the healthcare system is currently overloaded, thus leading to an increased
number of “collateral” deaths not directly linked to the virus.
4 Methods
4.1 Equilibrium points
The possible equilibria are given by (S¯, 0, 0, 0, 0, T¯ , H¯), with S¯ + T¯ + H¯ = 1. Indeed, in the system (1)-(8), S˙ = 0
if and only if either (i) S = 0 or (ii) αI + βD + γA+ δR = 0, namely I = D = A = R = 0 (or both).
(i) If S = 0, I˙ = 0 if and only if I = 0. Then, D˙ = 0 if and only if D = 0 and A˙ = 0 if and only if A = 0. Then,
R˙ = 0 if and only if R = 0. Finally, T˙ = 0 and H˙ = 0.
(ii) If I = D = A = R = 0, then I˙ = D˙ = A˙ = R˙ = 0, and also T˙ = 0 and H˙ = 0.
4.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The dynamical matrix of the linearised system around the equilibrium (S¯, 0, 0, 0, 0, T¯ , H¯) is
J =

0 −αS¯ −βS¯ −γS¯ −δS¯ 0 0 0
0 αS¯ − r1 βS¯ γS¯ δS¯ 0 0 0
0  −r2 0 0 0 0 0
0 ζ 0 −r3 0 0 0 0
0 0 η θ −r4 0 0 0
0 0 0 µ ν −r5 0 0
0 λ ρ κ ξ σ 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 τ 0 0

(31)
where r1 = + ζ + λ, r2 = η + ρ, r3 = θ + µ+ κ, r4 = ν + ξ, r5 = σ + τ .
The matrix has three null eigenvalues, and four eigenvalues roots of the polynomial
p(s) = D(s)− S¯N(s), (32)
where
D(s) = (s+ r1)(s+ r2)(s+ r3)(s+ r4)(s+ r5)
N(s) = (s+ r5) {α(s+ r2)(s+ r3)(s+ r4) + β(s+ r3)(s+ r4) + γζ(s+ r2)(s+ r4) + δ[η(s+ r3) + ζθ(s+ r2)]}
The transfer function from u to yS in Figure 2 is G(s) = N(s)/D(s). Since the system is positive, the H∞ norm
of G(s) is equal to the static gain G(0) = N(0)/D(0).
Then, by standard root locus (small gain argument) on the positive system G(s), we can say that the polynomial
is Hurwitz (all roots in the left hand plane) iff
S¯ < S¯∗ =
r1r2r3r4
αr2r3r4 + βr3r4 + γζr2r4 + δ(ηr3 + ζθr2)
,
where S¯∗ = 1/G(0). Therefore we are well justified to define the basic reproduction parameter
R0 :=
1
S¯∗
=
α+ β/r2 + γζ/r3 + δ(η/(r2r4) + ζθ/(r3r4))
r1
and stability of the equilibrium occurs for S¯R¯0 < 1.
Notice that R0 = G(0) is the H∞ norm of the transfer function G(s).
4.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Since S(t) is monotonically decreasing and non-negative, it has a limit S¯ ≥ 0. For t large enough, we have S(t) ≈ S¯.
Then the feedback system converges to the system with the static feedback S¯. If, by contradiction, S¯ renders
this system unstable, then x(t) diverges, since the Metzler matrix F + bS¯c> has a positive dominant eigenvalue.
In turn, this implies that x(t) cannot converge to zero, hence its components remain positive, which means that
αI + βD + γA+ δR > 0 does not converge to zero. As a consequence, also S˙ = −S(αI + βD + γA+ δR) < 0 does
not converge to zero, hence S(t) cannot converge to a non-negative value S¯ ≥ 0. We have reached a contradiction.
4.4 Proof of Proposition 3
From (14), we have S˙(t)/S(t) = −yS(t), namely −yS(t) = d log(S(t))dt . By integration we have∫ ∞
0
yS(φ)dφ = − log
(
S¯
S(0)
)
= log
(
S(0)
S¯
)
Now, assuming that F and b are constant, we integrate x˙(t):∫ ∞
0
x˙(φ)dφ = x(∞)− x(0) = F
∫ ∞
0
x(φ)dφ+ b
∫ ∞
0
u(φ)dφ = F
∫ ∞
0
x(φ)dφ+ b
∫ ∞
0
S(φ)yS(φ)dφ.
Since S˙(t) = −S(t)yS(t) and x(∞) = 0, we have
−x(0) = F
∫ ∞
0
x(φ)dφ− b
∫ ∞
0
S˙(φ)dφ = F
∫ ∞
0
x(φ)dφ− b(S¯ − S(0)).
We pre-multiply by c>F−1 and take into account that yS(t) = c>x(t):
−c>F−1x(0) =
∫ ∞
0
yS(φ)dφ− c>F−1b(S¯ − S(0)) = log
(
S(0)
S¯
)
− c>F−1b(S¯ − S(0)).
A simple calculation shows that −c>F−1b = R0, with R0 defined as in (18). Denoting f0 = −c>F−1x(0), we have
f0 +R0(S(0)− S¯) = log
(
S(0)
S¯
)
The other two formulas for H¯ and E¯ in Proposition 3 can be obtained by pre-multiplying the expression of
∫∞
0
x(φ)dφ
above by f> and d>, respectively.
4.5 Fit of the Model for the COVID-19 Outbreak in Italy
We infer the model parameters based on the official data (source: Protezione Civile and Ministero della Salute)
about the evolution of the epidemic in Italy beginning February 20, 2020 (day 1) through March 12, 2020 (day 22).
The data are turned into fractions over the whole Italian population (about 60 millions). The comparison between
the official data and the curves resulting from the SIDARTHE model is reported in Figure 6.
The estimated parameter values are based on the data about the number of currently infected individuals with
different SOI (essentially asymptomatic, quarantined at home, corresponding to variable D(t) in our model; symp-
tomatic and hospitalised, corresponding to variable R(t) in our model; symptomatic in life-threatening conditions,
admitted to ICUs, corresponding to variable T (t) in our model), and the number of diagnosed individuals who
recovered (which can be computed as
∫ t
0
[ρD(φ) + ξR(φ) + σT (φ)]dφ).
Data about the number of deaths (corresponding to E(t) in our model) appear particularly high with respect
to the case fatality rate reported in the literature; this can be largely explained by the age structure of the Italian
population, which is the second oldest in the world (and the reported CFR across all countries is steeply increasing
with the age of the patient) and by the extensive intergenerational contacts in the Italian society, which enhanced
the spreading of the virus among older and more fragile generations [41]. Perhaps more importantly, it can be also
explained by the Italian criteria for (provisional) statistics, which lead to overestimation. In fact, contrary to other
countries, the official numbers for COVID-19 deaths provisionally count the deaths of all the people tested positive
for the SARS-CoV-2 virus, even when they had multiple pre-existing life-threatening diseases and the exact cause
of death has not been ascertained yet, so these numbers still need to be confirmed [42].
Thus, an important challenge in tuning the model is that the initial data are affected by statistical distortion: in
particular, the values of the ratio death/infected is highly overestimated. The model fitting process must take this
problem into account. Therefore, we decide to fit the parameters based on the data about the diagnosed infected
population and the number of recovered diagnosed patients, but not on the data about deaths. It is also worth
stressing that, in the long run, the model is weakly sensitive to the initial conditions; for this reason, the initial
mismatch concerning the mortality data has little impact.
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(c) Currently infected with life-threatening symptoms: T (t).
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Figure 6: Comparison between the official data (red dots histogram) and the results with the calibrated SIDARTHE model (blue line).
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